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Abstract. Although the history of the Japanese invasion of China is well-known and well-
taught in China, the history of the currency war between China and Japan during the time is 
far less known. From 1937-1945, China and Japan engaged in not only a military war but 
also a "currency war." Japan, in an attempt to generate funds for the war from the war itself 
and to overthrow the Chinese government, attacked China's currency, the fabi (meaning 
“legal tender”), by printing counterfeit fabi notes and establishing “puppet” banks in China 
to issue mass amounts of puppet currencies to displace the fabi. These counterfeit notes and 
puppet currencies quickly circulated into the economy and led to a period known as the 
Great Chinese Inflation. Both the Nationalists (the governing party) and the Communists 
immediately took different actions to control inflation and the influx of counterfeit notes. 
The inflation was widespread not only in Nationalist and Communist-controlled areas, but 
also in Japanese-occupied areas of China. 
Keywords. China, Hyperinflation, Inflation, Second Sino-Japanese War, World War II. 
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1. Introduction 
uly 7, 1937 marked the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War. 
Using as an excuse the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, a skirmish between 
Japanese and Chinese troops near Beijing, the Japanese army attacked 
northern China. By the end of 1938, it occupied Nanking (Nanjing), the 
capital of China at the time; major cities such as Peking (Beijing), Canton 
(Guangzhou), and Wuhan; and most of northeastern China. By 1945, it 
occupied almost the entire eastern half of China. However, in areas of 
northern China bordering the Bohai Gulf and the Yellow Sea, the 
Communists set up anti-Japanese strongholds where villagers were mainly 
under Communist rule. The remaining land remained under Nationalist 
control. 
The Nationalists and the Communists did form an alliance to fight the 
Japanese. However, the Nationalists still viewed the Communists as a 
threat, and rarely consulted the Communists. Nevertheless, the 
Communists accepted any economic regulations that the Nationalists 
passed, and tried their best to help stabilize China’s economy and fight off 
the common enemy. When the Communists passed regulations in the 
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Communist anti-Japanese strongholds, the Nationalists likewise neither 
supported nor suppressed them. 
After the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese began to 
take measures to weaken China economically. They had several goals: to 
“fuel war with warfare” and make the war pay for itself, obtain all of 
China’s offshore funds, alter the exchange rate of the Chinese fabi to the 
yen, and overthrow the Chinese government after causing the collapse of 
the currency. During that time, the official Chinese currency, the fabi, 
literally translated as “legal tender,” was the only currency available for 
foreign exchange. So, instead of simply destroying the fabi, the Japanese 
occupation force decided to obtain as much fabi as possible and exchange 
all of it. To do so, it printed enormous amounts of counterfeit fabi notes. It 
also set up “puppet” banks in China that issued their own regional 
currencies as a way of decreasing demand for fabi. As a result, the fabi 
depreciated quickly, causing a period of hyperinflation that lasted until the 
end of the war. 
This paper focuses on the relationships between the amount of bank 
deposits and currency issued or circulated and inflation and exchange 
rates. The trends of statistics gathered from Japanese-occupied areas, 
Communist-occupied areas and Nationalist-occupied areas are compared 
and discussed with regard to the policies or regulations that the party had 
taken. No conclusion is made as to whether or not the actions taken were 
rational or correct. However, when compared, the analysis does reveal the 
effectiveness of different policies. 
 
2. Situation before the War 
In the early 1920s, China was a country that controlled neither its own 
territory nor its trade. After signing the so-called Unequal Treaties of the 
19th and early 20th centuries, Hong Kong was under British sovereignty, 
Macao was under Portuguese sovereignty, Taiwan was a Japanese colony, 
and Russia had significant influence in northern Manchuria. The ports of 
Weihaiwei and Kwangchowan (Guangzhouwan) were respectively leased 
to Britain and France, while Japan had leases in Port Arthur (Dalian). 
Several other cities, notably Shanghai, had foreign concessions – zones 
outside of Chinese jurisdiction where the police and courts were run by 
foreign powers. Foreign trade was subject to certain provisions imposed by 
the duress in the Unequal Treaties, and China’s Maritime Customs Service, 
a Chinese governmental tax collection agency that collected a large 
proportion of government revenue, was largely staffed at senior levels by 
foreigners. The Nationalist Party rose precisely because of its belief in 
abolishing the Unequal Treaties and foreign management of Chinese 
territory and customs duties. It overthrew the government in Peking in 
1927, reunifying most of China. Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the 
Nationalist Party, set on the path to secure China’s welfare and economic 
power. Recognizing the need for a modern financial system, the 
government created the Central Bank of China with headquarters in 
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Nanking in 1928. However, the Bank of China and the Bank of 
Communications, created by the Peking regime, were allowed to continue 
issuing notes. In addition to those banks, many cities or provinces had local 
banks that also issued notes, often denominated in a unique local currency. 
In the foreign concessions, branches of Western and Japanese banks issued 
notes that in some cases circulated extensively in a region because of their 
historical presence and perceived trustworthiness. 
The Nationalist government called on the period’s leading “money 
doctor,” Princeton University professor Edwin Kemmerer, to bring the 
Commission of Financial Experts to China for a year’s service in 1928. The 
Kemmerer Commission’s report said that China had “unquestionably the 
worst currency to be found in any important country” (Young 1971: 163). 
The coins, weights and paper money used varied from city to city, and 
national, provincial and private authorities each issued different types of 
currency. This made conversions between currencies difficult, as there was 
no official exchange rate and rates were solely decided by banks. Copper 
was widely used in everyday life, but China was regarded as a silver 
standard country because it used silver in banks and in the foreign 
exchange market. There was a myriad of types of silver dollars as well. 
Spanish Carolus dollars, American and British dollars, Japanese and Saigon 
dollars, and Mexican dollars, each coined at foreign and Chinese mints, 
were all in use. Lack of a uniform currency hampered arbitrage and 
contributed to price variations in different parts of China. 
The Kemmerer Commission recommended China to leave the silver 
standard and adopt the gold standard. However, the plan was never 
carried out because of the onset of the Great Depression. China experienced 
deflationary pressured in 1931 as Britain and a number of other countries 
went off the gold standard, increasing the foreign exchange value of 
China’s silver currency. Furthermore, Japan’s seizure of Manchuria in 1931 
and its attack on Shanghai in 1932 cut off China from provinces with key 
agricultural and natural resources. There was however a counteracting 
factor, the depreciation of silver against gold in world markets. Chiang had 
been planning a currency reform since 1929, and seeing the situation, 
decided that it was a good time to implement the reform in the end of 1932. 
A new Central Mint would coin silver into the “new silver dollar,” the new 
official currency used in the foreign exchange market. 
Influential forces in the United States believed that the slump in the 
price of silver harmed U.S. trade with China and other Asian countries. The 
buying power of countries with a silver-based currency such as China and 
India would be affected, so it was reasonable to help the countries by 
raising the price of silver. Conveniently, such a policy would also help the 
politically influential U.S. silver mining industry. Despite China’s 
disapproval, the United States enacted the Silver Purchase Law on June 21, 
1934. The act directed the U.S. Treasury to purchase silver until it reached 
one quarter of the Treasury’s combined stock of silver and gold. The price 
of silver began to soar. Seeing that its silver stock was almost depleted, the 
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Chinese government abandoned the free silver standard in 1935 and 
imposed a duty on the export of silver. That still did not help with the grim 
situation in China. Thus, Chiang decided that a more complete currency 
reform was necessary. In order to obtain the necessary capital needed for a 
complete currency reform, the Nationalist government, with the agreement 
of the United States, sold all its silver reserves to the United States. On 
November 4, 1935, the Central Bank of China, Bank of China and Bank of 
Communications began to issue China’s new currency, the fabi, officially 
abolishing silver as the monetary standard. The Central Bank of China 
became a Central Reserve Bank, and established more branches in different 
parts of China.  By 1937, the use of the fabi extended to southern China and 
it had become the unified currency of the country. 
The situation in Manchuria was different. In 1931, Japan had established 
the puppet state of Manchukuo after gaining sovereignty over Manchuria, 
an area that already issued its own currency. The currency became a form 
of silver exchange currency related to the silver dollar, but after China took 
itself off the silver standard, the currency was tied to the yen. In 1932, the 
government of Manchukuo established the Central Bank of Manchou to 
issue the Manchukuo yuan and replace all currencies previously used in 
the Manchukuo area. 
The foreign ports of China were affected by China’s abandonment of the 
silver standard. Less than a month after China introduced the fabi, Hong 
Kong, which had no central bank, established a currency board to link the 
Hong Kong dollar to the pound sterling. The fabi was initially tied to 
sterling in practice, so Hong Kong’s policy preserved exchange rate 
stability with mainland China. Similarly, Macau switched the anchor of the 
Macanese pataca, issued by the Portuguese Banco Nacional Ultramarino, 
from silver to the Portuguese escudo. The escudo was in turn tied to the 
pound sterling. In the British concession of Weihaiwei, there was no unified 
currency and all currencies could be used, including the Hong Kong dollar. 
In the foreign concessions, branches of foreign banks switched to the fabi to 
preserve their integration with the Chinese financial system. 
The next page shows a map of China in 1942. The areas with a pattern 
are Japanese-occupied areas, the rest are Nationalist-occupied. Communist-
occupied areas are dispersed throughout, and would look like little dots 
along, the borders of the stripe region. 
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Map 1. China and Japan to 1942 
 
Table 1. Chronology 
1894-1895 First Sino-Japanese War; China loses and cedes Taiwan to Japan 
1912 Republic of China replaces last emperor of Qing Dynasty 
1921 Communist Party is officially established 
1926-1928 Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition reunifies China under the 
rule of the Republic of China with capital in Nanking 
1928 Chiang Kai-shek’s government creates the Central Bank of China 
1931 Japanese invasion and conquest of Manchuria 
1935 China officially abandons the silver standard 
1937, July 7 Marco Polo Bridge Incident begins Second Sino-Japanese War; 
Japanese forces quickly gain occupies eastern China and 
Manchuria 
1937, November Republic of China’s capital is moved to Chungking 
1938, March 10 Japan opens the Federal Reserve Bank of China, a “puppet” bank 
to issue currency in recently conquered parts of China 
1941, January Japan opens Central Reserve Bank of China as a puppet issuer for 
central and southern China 
1941, December 7/8 Japan launches World War II in the Pacific (the Pacific War), which 
includes the occupation of foreign concession zones in China 
1945, September 2 Japanese surrender ends Second Sino-Japanese War and World 
War II; civil war arises between Nationalists and Communists 
1949, October 1 Victorious Communists proclaim People’s Republic of China 
 
3. Overview of issuing banks in different zones of 
occupation 
Table 2 lists the major Nationalist, Communist and Japanese banks that 
issued notes from 1937-1945 and describes some of their major features. 
The four Nationalist banks were all government banks. The Communists 
established many more banks, but most were small, so only two of the 
more influential ones are listed below and examined here. 
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Table 2. Major Note-Issuing Banks in Eastern China during the Second Sino-Japanese War 
Name Affiliation Headquarters Notes Issued Dates Influence/Branches 
Central Bank of Manchukuo Japanese Hsinking (Changchun) Manchu-quan 1932-1939 Manchukou and northern 
China 
Meng Chiang Bank Japanese Zhangjiakou Mengchiang-quan 1937-1945 Inner Mongolia 
Central Reserve Bank of 
China 
Japanese Peking (Beijing) Lianyin-quan 1938-1945 Northern, Central and South 
China 
Huaxing Commercial Bank Japanese Shanghai Huaxing-quan, 
Chubei-quan 
1939-1940; 
1940-1943 
Anhui Province, Central China 
Federal Reserve Bank of 
China 
Japanese Nanking (Nanjing) Zhongchu-quan 1941-1945 Central and southern China 
Bank of Shansi, Chahar and 
Hopei 
Communist Shuizhuizhen SCH-quan 1938-1948 Northern China 
Bank of Huainan Communist Xiejiaji Huainan-bi 1942-1945 Central China 
Bank of China Nationalist Shanghai Fabi 1935-1945 Nanking, leading cities in 
China 
Bank of Communications Nationalist Shanghai then 
Chungking 
(Chongqing) 
Fabi 1935-1945 Nanking, leading cities in 
China 
Central Bank of China Nationalist Shanghai Fabi 1935-1945 Nanking, leading cities in 
China 
Farmers Bank Nationalist Hankou then 
Chungking 
Fabi 1935-1942 Central and southern China 
Note: The table excludes Hong Kong (where three note-issuing banks acted as agents for the Exchange 
Fund), Macau (Banco Nacional Ultramarino), and Taiwan (Bank of Taiwan). It also excludes Western 
banks that issued in foreign concession areas until 1941 but then ceased; a host of small local Chinese 
issuers; and the western regions of Tibet (Tibetan government issue) and Sinkiang (Xinjiang) (local issue 
by a Soviet-backed government). 
 
4. Policies and statistics in Japanese-Occupied areas 
Since Japan occupied the majority of northern China by the end of 1937, 
the Japanese government decided to set up its first puppet bank in Beijing. 
On February 5, 1938, the outline for the Federal Reserve Bank of China was 
published. The bank would stabilize the yen, control China’s financial 
markets and issue bank notes called lianyin-quan (meaning“Federal 
Reserve Bank note”), which had the same value as the fabi and was pegged 
to the yen in the foreign exchange market. Branches would be set up in 
other major cities of China and would be allowed to issue the lianyin-quan 
as well. The Japanese hoped that they could thus acquire large sums of fabi 
and even bring northern China under one united currency: the lianyin-
quan.  
On March 10 of the same year, the Federal Reserve Bank of China 
opened for business. The very next day, the Japanese government banned 
the use of the fabi, and three months later, banned the use of bank notes 
issued by most major banks in northern China. On August 7, the fabi and 
lianyin-quan could no longer be exchanged at an equal rate:100 fabi were 
officially only worth 60 lianyin-quan. By the end of 1941, though, the 
amount of lianyin-quan issue increased drastically to match the fabi’s 
depreciation. As other parts of China experienced inflation, the Japanese-
occupied areas that used the lianyin-quan experienced it as well. 
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In central China, the Huaxing Commercial Bank was established in 1939 
by the Weixin government, a Japanese puppet government. Its functions 
were identical to those of the China Joint Reserve Bank. From 1939-1940, it 
issued the huaxing-quan, and from 1940-1943, it issued the chubei-quan 
(meaning“reserve note”). The huaxing-quan was originally set equal to the 
fabi, but on July 20, 1939, the exchange rate was fixed at 1 huaxing-quan to 
0.06 pound sterling. The change actually made the huaxing-quan less 
competitive in international trade, so, to counter that effect, it was soon 
replaced by the chubei-quan. From 1939-1940, only 5billion yen of huaxing-
quan were issued each year (Nakamura 1994: 333). 
 
 
 
Figure 1a. Lianyin- and Huaxing-quan Issued 1938-1941.6 (thousand yen)  
 
 
 
Figure 1b. Lianyin- and Chubei-quan Issued, 1941.6-1945 (bn yen) 
Source: Nakamura (1994: 412). 
 
The names of the puppet banks were on purpose made similar to those 
of non-puppet Chinese banks. Just by looking at the names, even regular 
citizens were unaware that these were puppet banks established by the 
Japanese. The staff serving customers were also all Chinese, although most 
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executives, consultants, advisors, and foreign exchange managers were 
Japanese. However, even after the people realized that these were Japanese 
puppet banks and were called traitors if they affiliated with the banks, they 
were willing to make deposits. The puppet banks offered much higher 
interest rates than other banks, and thus were able to receive more deposits 
(Shibata 1999: 354). In this way, the Japanese were able to collect huge sums 
of fabi, and use them for trade with both foreign countries and Nationalist-
occupied areas of China. 
 
 
Figure 2. Bank Deposits in Northeast China as of December 1942 (mn yen) 
Source: Shibata(1999: 290-292). 
 
In addition to banning the use of fabi and forcing all villagers to 
exchange their fabi for the puppet currency, the Japanese government also 
obtained fabi in two ways. First, it smuggled Japanese goods into China 
and then sold them. During the war, there were not a lot of goods and 
resources readily available. The smuggled goods were cheaper than usual 
goods, so Chinese merchants were willing to pay the Japanese, in fabi, for 
supply of these goods. In general, any goods sold by the Japanese in non-
Japanese occupied areas were done so in fabi. The fabi would then be sold 
in the foreign exchange market. 
Second, the Japanese government printed and circulated mass amounts 
of counterfeit fabi notes into non-Japanese occupied areas. It soon realized 
that the technology needed to make the fabi note was rather low-quality 
and was easy to reproduce. In 1939, it began experimenting, and, in 1940, 
counterfeit fabi notes were mixed in with real ones when trading with 
Chinese companies outside of Japanese-occupied areas. Since this added 
fabi notes in the market, the Chinese currency become more unstable and 
prone to inflation. 
 
5. Policies and statistics in Communist-Occupied areas 
Policies in Communist-occupied areas had three goals: to issue currency 
that protected the people’s welfare and the economy of the anti-Japanese 
base; to issue a separate currency so the base would not be affected by 
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counterfeit notes; and to appropriately handle the relationship between the 
local currency and the fabi. The rules that the Communists proposed were 
to limit the amount of local currency issued so that it would not exceed the 
amount needed in the local market. This would guarantee the local 
currency’s credit and therefore the people’s trust. As the Communists’ 
priority was to protect national interests, they decided to support and 
protect the fabi as much as possible and allow its use in addition to the 
local currency. However, they did expect to eventually eliminate the fabi 
from the local market because the local currency was the most reliable 
currency at the time. It could not be used in the foreign exchange market 
and was not a dominant currency like the fabi, so the Japanese government 
would not bother with counterfeiting the small Communist issues. 
In some Communist-occupied areas, inflation rates were not as high as 
those of Nationalist or Japanese-occupied regions. This was because the 
Communists countered inflation by setting up banks of their own and 
issuing their own notes, broadly called the kang-bi (meaning “anti-
Japanese war notes”). It is said that over 600 different types of kang-bi 
existed during 1937 to 1945, as each anti-Japanese base established its own 
form of currency. Each base also operated separately and took slightly 
different measures, but the over-arching policies were similar. Unlike the 
Nationalists, the Communists immediately banned the use of Japanese-
issued notes. 
Table 2 lists two major Communist note-issuing banks. In the east-
central city of Huainan, the Huainan Bank was established to print the 
huainan-bi. The exchange rate with the fabi was flexible, but would only 
change after at least half a year. A stamp was put on top of the huainan-bi 
to denote its fabi value. After May of 1944, the fabi depreciated at such a 
rapid pace that the huainan-bi could no longer continue readjusting to it. 
The xinkang-bi (meaning “new anti-Japanese war note”) replaced the older 
versions of the huainan-bi and the exchange rate was adjusted from 1 
huainan-bi = 5 fabi to 1 xinkang-bi = 50 fabi (Zhang 1991: 73). 
In Hebei province, the Bank of Shansi, Chahar and Hopei was 
established in 1938 for a function similar to that of the Bank of Huainan. It 
provided for a much larger region – Shansi province, Chahar province and 
Hopei province. Since this area was the largest anti-Japanese base near 
Japanese-occupied parts of northern China, the bank’s headquarters 
constantly moved from one city to another. Despite the change, inflation in 
the three provinces remained less severe than those in other cities (see 
Table 3). 
In anti-Japanese bases in Hebei province, members of the Red Army 
worked with villagers to try to become self-sufficient and minimize the 
amount of resources they bought. They also tried to teach villagers how to 
differentiate between real fabi and Japanese-issued counterfeit fabi. To 
enable the use of the Communist-issued currency, the Red Army made sure 
that Japanese soldiers were either scared or unable to disrupt marketplaces. 
This ensured the safety of both the merchants and the villagers, so 
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confidence in the local currency slowly increased. Throughout the war, 
areas that experienced the least inflation were typically Communist-
occupied areas. 
 
Table 3. Inflation in different parts of China 
Year Average Chongqing 
(Nationalist) 
Chengdu 
(Nationalist) 
Fuping (Hebei 
Province) (Communist) 
Japanese-Occupied 
Northern Areas 
1938 131 126 128 100 143 
1939 220 220 225 272 232 
1940 513 569 665 1092 506 
1941 1,296 1576 1769 899 1099 
1942 3900 4408 4559 1469 3453 
1943 12541 13298 14720 9774 14362 
1944 43197 43050 56965 34483 284302 
1945 163160 156195 170379 54601 9740248 
Note: Using Fuping in 1938 as the base, 100. 
Source: Zhang (1986: 242), Dai (1995: 284). 
 
6. Policies and atatistics in Nationalist-Occupied areas 
Compared to the Communists, the Nationalists had to deal with 
Japanese attacks on a much larger scale as they were still the dominant, 
ruling party at the time. The government needed funds to fight the war, 
and the continuous increase in government spending led to an increase in 
government budget deficit. From 1937 to 1945, military spending attributed 
to roughly 60-70% of annual total government spending. Government 
revenues were unable to keep up with government spending, and, by the 
end of the war, government deficit was as high as 1,106,696,000,000 fabi 
and government revenue was only roughly 20% of the total spending 
(Chang 1986: 80). 
To account for this increasing deficit, the Nationalists printed more and 
more fabi (see Table 5).Each year, they printed at least twice as many as 
they had the previous year. As Japanese manipulation had already caused 
the deprecation of the fabi, the endless influx of fabi made matters worse. 
In 1935, the Nationalist government had announced that fabi would be 
printed in only four national banks of China: the Bank of China, Bank of 
Communications, Central Bank of China and Farmers Bank. Despite 
inflation, the government was reluctant to issue notes with larger 
denominations. Thus, when the people wanted to make exchanges, they 
had to carry large parcels of smaller notes. This reluctance created 
inconvenience for the people as well as the government. As more ink, 
paper and banknotes were needed to print a larger amount of bank notes, 
the government had to pay no less than US$55 million to account for the 
rising printing costs (Young 1965: 161). 
Nominal bank deposits also grew. However, the increase of deposits 
reflected rapidly rising prices and increased credits instead of savings. 
Total deposits in commercial and provincial banks grew less than 10-fold 
during the war, but average prices increased about 2600-fold (Young 
1965:164). Therefore, total deposits actually shrank greatly in real value. In 
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addition, the share of government banks in total deposits grew as the war 
continued on, mostly because the capital funds of private banks could not 
keep up with inflation. 
 
Table 4. Increase of Total Note Issue and Bank Deposits in Free China (millions fabi) 
Year end Increase of note issue Increase of bank deposits Value of issue in terms of prewar notes 
1938 674 847 1310 
1939 2059 1905 1325 
1940 3635 1777 1085 
1941 7376 5979 765 
1942 19509 9146 520 
1943 40062 12784 330 
1944 114082 69614 250 
1945 842471 432553 415 
Note: The base is January – June 1937 = 1. 
Source: Young (1965:163, 304). 
 
The Nationalists tried to sell gold to stabilize the value of the fabi and 
increase citizens’ confidence in the fabi, but it did not work. The thought of 
selling gold already made villagers feel insecure, and when inflation 
persisted, villagers no longer believed in the value of the fabi. Furthermore, 
the Nationalists did not respond much to Japan’s actions, and were view by 
the populace as having simply accepted the consequences. The government 
finally acted to ban the use of Japanese-issued notes, limit the amount of 
fabi that could be exchanged internationally, and print counterfeit notes to 
use in Japanese-occupied areas. It is hard to analyze the relevant statistics 
because it is believed that, by the time the Nationalists enforced these 
regulations, inflation was so out of hand that it was almost impossible to 
handle. 
Another way the Nationalists dealt with the deficit was to raise tax 
revenue. The government created an estate tax, an inheritance tax, and a tax 
on excess profits, and increased the tax on firms and of stamp duties. 
Income taxes were imposed only on government officials, and, in April of 
1942, a sales tax ranging from 5 – 25 percent was imposed, with more 
essential goods being taxed at lower rates. Most effective was the reform of 
the taxation on salt. In 1941, the salt tax was changed to an ad valorem 
basis and taxed according to its monetary value. Then, in 1943, an extra tax 
of 300 fabi per barrel was added. In 1944, tax revenue from salt made up 
over 60 percent of total tax revenue, a 20 percentage point increase from 
that in 1943 (Chang 1986: 89). 
The Nationalist government was also the only government to issue 
foreign bonds, as the Communists were unable to do so and the Japanese 
only issued bonds in Japan. In preparation for war, it had issued 500 
million fabi worth of bonds in both 1937 and 1938. From 1940-1941, it 
renamed the bonds to “bonds to support military goods” and “bonds for 
economic recovery,” and issued 1.2 billion fabi worth of bonds each year. 
The bonds were renamed once again in 1942 to “bonds for victory,” and, by 
1945, over 9 billion fabi worth of bonds had been issued (Chang 1986: 97). 
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Although these bonds helped, American and British willingness to lend 
money to China was crucial to the Nationalists’ war efforts. With the onset 
of the Pacific War, the United States and Great Britain began to see China 
as an ally. In 1942, the United States lent the Nationalist government 2 
billion dollars and allowed it to sell bonds in U.S. dollars. Great Britain also 
agreed to lend 50 million pounds sterling (equal to 212 million dollars). 
 
7. The gold and silver problem 
Although most countries around the world took their currencies off the 
gold or silver standards during the Great Depression, the inherent value of 
gold and silver was still recognized. It could be used to buy foreign 
currency, so if a country had gold or silver, it would have access to foreign 
currency and therefore more resources. As gold and silver were 
traditionally valuable in Chinese culture, Chinese families typically 
possessed them in some way. Thus, Japan targeted China’s supply of gold 
and silver. First, its army raided gold and silver directly from villagers, 
banks, and local governments they occupied. Then, by using the power of 
their puppet governments and puppet banks, Japan enforced policies to 
obtain coins in Chinese currency, since they were made of gold and silver. 
In fact, the Central Reserve Bank of Chinaeven had a special “gold-and-
silver-obtaining” department. In northern China, the Bank of Manchou 
bought over 32 million grams of gold by 1945, of which almost 30 million 
grams were used to exchange foreign currency and buy goods for the 
Japanese military. Furthermore, the price at which the Bank of Manchou 
bought gold was rather low: 2.47 fabi per gram until 1943, and 4.4 fabi per 
gram after 1943 (Dai 1995: 229). 
In response, the Nationalist government tried to maintain and even 
increase its supply of gold and silver. It limited exports of gold and 
mandated that only the government could purchase gold. Therefore, 
citizens could only sell their gold and silver to the state. However, as the 
government itself was in financial difficulty, it did not have the ability to 
buy or mine additional gold, and gold began to be sold in the black market 
at a high price. The government was then forced to allow the free sale of 
gold again in 1943. In the same year, the government changed its policies so 
that it began to sell instead of buying gold to obtain more fabi to use. This 
shift was mainly due to the United States’ 2 billion dollar loan to China. 
The respite that the U.S. loan permitted did not ultimately prevent 
hyperinflation. 
 
8. Printed currency, exchange rates, and inflation 
As the war continued, all banks printed more of their currency. 
However, the amount of fabi printed by the end of the war far surpassed 
the amounts of other currencies. At the same time, the exchange rate of the 
fabi to Japanese-issued currencies fluctuated. Even though the exchange 
rates show that inflation was highest in areas using the fabi, inflation 
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occurred throughout China. This suggests that, as the amount of currency 
and notes available in the Chinese economy as a whole increased, inflation 
rates rose throughout the country. 
 
Table 5. Notes issued by Chinese and Japanese banks, 1935-1945 (in millions) 
Note: After July 30, 1942, only the Central Bank of China issued notes. *July 31, 1944. 
Source: Young (1965: 364, 366), Hong (2005: 657). 
 
The existence of the British and French concessions at Tientsin (Tianjin) 
largely restricted Japan’s ability to gain full economic control over northern 
China, because the concessions contained the main trade and financial 
center of the region. Although the British accepted some of Japan’s 
demands in December of 1938, such as the acceptance of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of China currency, they firmly refused to make it the legal 
tender of the concessions. This stalemate and the worsening of diplomatic 
relationships caused the foreign exchange rate of Federal Reserve Bank of 
China notes to match the trend of the fabi until December 1941, when 
Japanese forces occupied the international concessions of all Chinese cities 
under their control in parallel with the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor, 
the Philippines, Malaya, and Thailand (Young 1965: 172). 
The Japanese also controlled credit expansion in northern China more 
strictly, so prices in Tianjin in terms of Federal Reserve Bank of China notes 
from 1941 were much lower than those in Free China. In 1945, the rate of 
increase of prices in Tianjin exceeded that in Free China as the tide of the 
war turned to favor the Nationalists and the Communists (Young 1965: 
173). 
 
 
 
 
 Nationalist banks Japanese banks 
Period Central Bank 
of China 
Bank of 
China 
Bank of 
Com-muni-
cations 
Far-mers 
Bank 
Total, 4  
govern-ment 
banks (fabi) 
Central Bank 
of Man-
chukuo  
(yen) 
Federal 
Reserve Bank 
(FRB$) 
Central Reserve 
Bank (CRB$) 
Military notes 
(military yen) 
Meng-cheng  
Bank (yen) 
1935.12 176 286 180 30 673      
1936.12 326 459 295 162 1,242      
1937.6 376 510 314 208 1,407      
1937.12 431 607 371 231 1,639 307   1.4 13 
1938.6 490 653 322 262 1,727      
1938.12 768 712 548 277 2,305 426 162  36 36 
1939.6 768 991 603 339 2,700      
1939.12 1,880 1,227 814 365 4,287 624 458  151 60 
1940.6 2,894 1,650 1,008 511 6,063      
1940.12 3,852 1,947 1,329 739 7,867 947 715  248 63 
1941.6 4,808 3,045 1,784 1,079 10,715      
1941.12 6,341 4,349 2,631 1,812 15,133 1,201 964 237 244 114 
1942.6 8,468 6,848 4,204 5,425 24,945      
1942.12 34,360 0 0 0 34,360 1,670 1,581 3,477 381 143 
1943.12 75,379 0 0 0 75,379 3,011 3,762 19,150 407 379 
1944.12 189,461 0 0 0 189,461 5,877 15,841 139,699 671 2,499* 
1945.12 1,031,932 0 0 0 1,031,932 8,158 83,506 2,697,231 1,516  
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Table 6. Retail and Wholesale Prices in Occupied and in Free China 
Year 
Wholesale prices in occupied 
China 
Average of retail 
market prices in 
Free China 
Retail Market Prices in chief cities of Free 
China 
Tientsin/Peipinga Shanghai Chungking Chengdu Hengyang 
1937.6 1 1 1 1.01b 0.97c 1.05d 
1938e 1.29 - 1.45 1.4 1.215 1.76 
1939.6 1.77 1.64 2.26 1.91 1.55 2.73 
1939.12 2.47 3.18 3.23 2.82 2.82 3.41 
1940.6 3.7 4.51 4.87 5.33 5.22 4.26 
1940.12 3.48 5.23 7.24 11.12 10.49 5.56 
1941.6 3.61 8.03 10.5 14.97 15.02 8.7 
1941.12 5.84f 15.6 19.8 26.79 22.68 17.6 
1942.6 7.22 29.4 35.9 48.3 36.2 37.9 
1942.12 11.7 44.7 66.2 69.5 68.4 81.5 
1943.6 18.6 104 132 105 127 129 
1943.12 33.5 214 228 199 246 235 
1944.6 81.6 560 466 422 543 357g 
1944.12 351 2490 755 651 764 - 
1945.6 1455 21300 2167 1763 1704 - 
1945.8 3791 85200 2647 4215h 2509i - 
Notes: a Tientsin: 1937.6 – 1941.6; Peiping (Beijing): 1941.12-1945.8. b, c, d July 1937. e Average for 1938. f 
January 1942. g April 1944. h, i December 1945. 
Source: Young (1965: 152, 351). 
 
Inflation itself is characterized by a high turn-over rate (velocity) of money, in 
which people are less willing to hold money because its purchasing power is 
falling quickly. They would much rather buy, and did buy, more and more goods. 
This was the case in Free China. The increase in the amount of notes issued caused 
prices to rise, hurt consumer confidence and increased the turn-over rate, causing 
prices to rise once again. Although the 1935 currency reform greatly strengthened 
the people’s confidence in the fabi, the continued increase in the amount of fabi 
issued later gradually destroyed confidence.  
 
Table 7. Increase of prices and note issue in Free and Occupied China, 1937-1945 
 Free China Occupied North China Occupied Central and South China 
 Indexes  Indexes  Indexes  
Time Retail 
prices 
(avg)a 
Fabi note 
issueb 
Excess of price 
over note index 
(%) 
Wholesale 
prices at 
Peipingc 
FRB 
note 
issue 
Excess of price 
over note index 
(%) 
Wholesale 
prices at 
Shanghai 
CRB 
note 
issue 
Excess of price 
over note 
index (%) 
1937.7 1.04 1.02 2       
1937.12 1.18 1.13 5       
1938.6 1.40 1.17 20       
1938.12 1.76 1.48 19       
1939.6 2.26 1.70 33       
1939.12 3.23 2.55 27 1.00 1.00 -    
1940.6 4.87 3.50 39       
1940.12 7.24 4.38 65 1.41 1.56 -9    
1941.6 10.51 6.10 74       
1941.12 15.95 8.46 88 2.36d 2.11 12    
1942.6 35.9 13.8 160       
1942.12 66.2 18.9 250 4.73 3.45 37 1.00 1.00 - 
1943.6 132 27.2 385       
1943.12 228 40.8 458 13.6 8.22 65 4.76 5.18 -8 
1944.6 466 66.1 605       
1944.12 755 102 640 142 34.6 310 55.3 37.8 46 
1945.6 2167 214 912       
1945.12 2491 556 349 1535 183 740 1895 902 110 
Notes: a January - June 1937 retail prices = 1. b Fabi issued as of June 30 1937 = 1. c Figures for 1939 and 
1940 are for Tientsin. No complete series is available for Tientsin or Peiping, but combining the two 
series appears to involve no substantial error. d January 1942. Source: Young (1965: 303). 
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The velocity of money can be used to analyze Japanese-occupied areas 
of China as well. At first, the number of notes issued grew faster than the 
rise of prices, reducing velocity. During that period, confidence in fabi was 
widespread, showing that the Nationalist government’s initial effort to 
print more bank notes was effective. As time passed and the people became 
aware that the amount of notes printed would only further increase, 
consumer confidence began to decrease. 
From all the data above, it can be concluded that inflation and therefore 
prices were heavily tied to the amount of notes issued by the banks. The 
currencies that were created after the fabi (lianyin-quan, huaxing-quan, 
military yen and huainan-bi) were worth more compared to the fabi, but, as 
larger amounts of the currencies were continuously printed, all the 
currencies depreciated like the fabi did and prices rose in the 
corresponding areas. 
 
9. Conclusion 
The inflation of China from 1937-1945 led to a period of turmoil for the 
country and a shift of confidence in the government from the people. Even 
though Japan did not win the Second Sino-Japanese War, its plan to attack 
China both militarily and financially was successful in many ways. It 
strongly damaged the fabi, pressuring the Nationalist government to use 
more resources and capital to maintain the stability of the economy and the 
welfare of the citizens. The Japanese did harm to themselves, too, because 
their plan did not go as smoothly as they had hoped. The currencies they 
issued through puppet banks eventually followed a pattern of inflation 
similar to that of the fabi, and they had to think of ways to protect 
themselves while continuing to damage China’s currency. When put in this 
perspective, the Communists seemed to have benefitted the most from this 
series of events. The inflation brought the legitimacy and competence of the 
Nationalist Party into question, and extinguished the strong support for the 
currency reform of 1935 and unyielding confidence in fabi within the first 
few years of the war. The Communists’ policies during the inflation also 
proved to be somewhat effective, making those who lived in Communist-
occupied areas at least as well-off as those in other parts of China. This 
boosted the party’s image and credibility, and may even have laid the basis 
for their subsequent victory in 1949. Thus, it should not be an exaggeration 
to say that the data provided show that China’s wartime inflation 
contributed to the rise of the party that proved it had the ability to 
successfully manage economic crises. 
 
Data Note 
An accompanying spreadsheet workbook contains additional data and 
graphs. 
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